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CASENOTE
THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN "MAD" AND "BAD": IS
"LACK-OF-CONTROL" A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1993, thirty-one-year-old Michael Crane entered a
tanning salon in Johnson County, Kansas and exposed himself to
the nineteen-year-old female attendant.1 Thirty minutes later, he
entered a nearby video store and waited for all of the customers
to leave.2 Once the store was empty, Crane exposed himself to the
twenty-year-old female clerk, threatened to rape her, grabbed her
by the back of the neck, and demanded that she perform oral sex
on him.3 He then suddenly and abruptly stopped the attack and
ran out of the store.4
Crane was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct for the
tanning salon incident, and attempted aggravated criminal sod-
omy, attempted rape, and kidnapping for the video store inci-
dent.' He was sentenced to thirty-five years to life in prison.6 The
Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the attempted aggravated
sodomy and attempted rape convictions based on the State's fail-
ure to charge the necessary elements.7 The court also reversed
1. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Kan. 1996).
2. Id. at 1259.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1258.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1265-69.
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the conviction of kidnapping because of a lack of evidence.' After
refiling the charges, the state entered into a plea agreement with
Crane in which he pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual
battery.9 He was released from jail within five years.'0
Release for Crane did not, however, equal freedom. His crimi-
nal history and antisocial personality subjected him to the Kan-
sas Sexually Violent Predator Act,1' which was intended "to ad-
dress the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks
they present to society" by creating "a separate involuntary civil
commitment process for the potentially long-term control, care
and treatment" for such offenders. 2 As one of Crane's victims
stated, the statute provides an "option later down the road" to en-
sure that individuals like Crane cannot re-offend. 3
As of 1997, seventeen states had enacted sexually violent
predator laws that allow for the involuntary civil commitment of
sexual offenders upon completion of their criminal sentence. 4 In
most instances, this legislation occurred in response to the sexual
murder of a child or a young woman committed by a person with
a history of sexual violence, as these events created intense public
concern that the criminal justice system was inadequate in pre-
venting sex offenders from repeating similar crimes. 5 The enact-
ment of these statutes, however, raised numerous constitutional
challenges. 6 While the decisions of lower courts have been
mixed, 7 the United States Supreme Court upheld the application
of sexually violent predator laws in Kansas and Washington."
8. Id. at 1271-73.
9. Brief for Respondent at 2, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
10. See id. at 2-3.
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -a20 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
12. Id. § 59-29a01.
13. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).
14. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Accord-
ing to Justice Breyer, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin each enacted a statutory scheme for the civil commitment of
sex offenders. Id. app. at 397-98.
15. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 43, 66 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
16. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 256 (2001) (reviewing claims that Wash-
ington's law violated the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the United States Constitution).
17. Compare Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 751, 753-54 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (in-
validating Washington's law as violating substantive due process requirements, Ex Post
Facto, and Double Jeopardy Clauses), vacated, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997), with In re
Young, 857 P.2d 989, 999-1000 (Wash. 1993) (upholding Washington's law against
substantive due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy claims).
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Acceptance of these statutes, however, has not been without
limitation. In Kansas v. Crane,9 the Supreme Court created a
new substantive due process requirement for civil confinement
that has significant implications for the future of sexually violent
predator legislation. The Court incorporated a "lack-of-control"
standard into the necessary elements for sexually violent preda-
tor laws, requiring the state to submit "proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior" in order to justify civil confinement. °
This note evaluates the viability of the "lack-of-control" stan-
dard in the legal context. Part II provides a description of the
"mental illness" standards that historically formed the basis of
substantive due process rights in civil commitment proceedings.
Part III describes the specific principles and guidelines of the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. 1 Part IV includes an
analysis of the 1997 case, Kansas v. Hendricks,22 in which the
Court interpreted the Act and established the "Volitional control"
standard" later clarified in Kansas v. Crane.' Parts V and VI
analyze the Court's holding in Crane, and discusses its impact in
the application of sexually violent predator statutes. Finally, in
Part VII, the note addresses the future direction of sexually vio-
lent predator laws, and proposes alternatives to civil commitment
that may more equitably balance states' and offenders' rights.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF CIVIL COMMITMENT STANDARDS
The ability of states to restrict the liberty of their citizens de-
rives primarily from two sources: the police power and the parens
patriae power.2 5 The police power authorizes states to restrain in-
stantive due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy claims).
18. See Young, 531 U.S. at 263 (upholding Washington law against ex post facto and
double jeopardy claims); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61 (upholding Kansas's law against
ex post facto and double jeopardy claims).
19. 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002).
20. Id. at 870.
21. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -a20 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
22. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
23. See id. at 356-60.
24. Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 868-72.
25. Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The
Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 117, 124 (1999).
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dividuals who threaten public safety.26 This power is most often
exercised in actions taken by the state to incarcerate criminals.27
The other source of power stems from the parens patriae princi-
ple, which provides the states with the authority to protect indi-
viduals who lack the ability to care for themselves.28
These two powers, while fundamentally different in principle,
frequently overlap when states are faced with individuals who
are both mentally ill and dangerous.29 Together, they provide
states with the ability to confine an individual against his will
when there is sufficient evidence that his mental condition makes
him a danger to himself or others.3 0
A. The Development of Civil Commitment Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court first established substantive
restrictions on state civil commitment practices in Jackson v.
Indiana.1 In Jackson, the Court held that "due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reason-
able relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
ted."32 The Court further articulated the necessary standards for
civil commitment in O'Connor v. Donaldson,33 holding that it was
unconstitutional for a state to continue to confine a harmless
mentally ill person merely for preventative purposes.34 The Court
stated that "there is still no constitutional basis for confining
such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and
can live safely in freedom."35
26. Id.
27. See Kris W. Druhm, Comment, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal
Law § 645, the Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 327
(1997).
28. Falk, supra note 25, at 124.
29. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
30. Id.
31. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
32. Id. at 738.
33. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. Id. at 574-75.
35. Id. at 575.
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The next significant case in civil commitment jurisprudence
was Addington v. Texas.3" In Addington, the Court held that to
justify civil commitment, the Due Process Clause required the
state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person
sought to be committed was both mentally ill and required hospi-
talization for his own welfare and the protection of others.37 Fur-
ther, the Court outlined the scope of mental illness, 38 restricting
the designation of "mentally ill" to those individuals who suffer
from an ailment of the mind-rather than those who exhibit mere
"idiosyncratic behavior" falling within a range of "generally ac-
ceptable conduct."39
The Court revisited civil commitment standards in Jones v.
United States.4" In Jones, the Court held that a detainee could be
committed until such time that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous, regardless of the amount of time he would have been
criminally confined for his offense.4 ' The Court also unequivocally
stated that "continuing mental illness and dangerousness" were
the substantive requirements of due process for civil commitment
statutes.
After Jones, the Court began to place more definite boundaries
on the appropriate length of confinement. In Foucha v. Louisi-
ana,43 the Court held that the continued commitment of an ac-
quittee is improper absent a determination in a civil commitment
proceeding of current mental illness and dangerousness. 4 The
Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would permit a state "to
hold indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who
could be shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to
criminal conduct."45 The Court strongly discouraged the use of
civil commitment laws as a means for preventative confinement
based on dangerousness alone.46
36. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
37. Id. at 421, 432-33.
38. See id. at 426-27.
39. Id. at 427.
40. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
41. See id. at 368-69.
42. See id. at 368.
43. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
44. Id. at 78, 86.
45. Id. at 82.
46. See id. at 82-83.
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
Court's judgment in Foucha 47' but argued that its holding did not
prevent states from constructing more "narrowly drawn... stat-
utes that provide for punishment of persons who commit crimes
while mentally ill."4" She asserted that the confinement of insan-
ity acquittees may be appropriate under circumstances in which
"the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect
pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continu-
ing dangerousness."49 However, Justice O'Connor included the
caveat that these individuals "could not be confined as mental pa-
tients absent some medical justification for doing so."5" This
"medical justification" standard has since been cited as one of the
unofficial criteria for civil commitment decisions.51
The Court addressed the next important commitment proceed-
ing issue in Allen v. Illinois.52 In Allen, the Court held that the
commitment proceedings "were not 'criminal' within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."53 The
Court based its decision on statutory construction, emphasizing
the fact that the language of the Illinois Act specifically stated
that it was "civil in nature." 4 The Court found that "the State
ha[d] disavowed any interest in punishment" and incorporated
into the Act psychological treatment for the individual.5 5 More-
over, the Court did not view the statute as punitive in nature be-
cause it allowed for the release of the individual at any time upon
a proper showing of rehabilitation. 6 This holding had significant
implications for sex offenders and further opened the door to the
enactment of sexually violent predator laws. 7
47. See id. at 86-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 87.
49. Id. at 87-88.
50. Id. at 88.
51. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997).
52. 478 U.S. 364(1986).
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id. at 368.
55. Id. at 370.
56. Id. at 369.
57. See Stephen R. McAllister, "Punishing" Sex Offenders, 46 KAN. L. REV. 27, 37, 39-
41 (1997).
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B. Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators
The first "sex psychopath" statutes emerged in the late 1930s
and were intended to divert dangerous sex offenders from the
criminal justice system to the mental health system.58 Individuals
confined under these statutes were typically held until such time
as they were completely "recovered" or were no longer dangerous
to society.59 However, amid growing civil rights concerns during
the 1980s, legislatures began to face questions regarding the abil-
ity of mental health professionals to accurately predict danger-
ousness and to provide effective treatment for sexual predators.0
Consequently, by 1990 a number of states abolished their sexual
offender commitment statutes.6'
Concerns regarding the high recidivism rates of sex offenders
did not abate, however, and many states have resuscitated these
laws, recasting them as sexual predator statutes.62 The first
sexually violent predator law to emerge was the Washington
Community Protection Act of 1990.63 This Act specifically targets
those offenders who committed at least one prior crime of sexual
violence and were found to suffer from a "mental abnormality or
personality disorder" that made them likely to commit future acts
of sexual violence.64 The Act allows prosecutors to initiate civil
proceedings to provide for the confinement and treatment of these
offenders for an indeterminate period of time.65 In the first seven
years following the Act's passage, approximately one percent of
58. Raquel Blacher, Comment, A Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath" Stat-
ute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REv. 889,
897 (1995).
59. See id. at 898.
60. Id. at 906; Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 105, 109-10 (1990); Kimberly A- Dorsett, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks:
Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous New Era in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
113, 115 (1998).
61. Bodine, supra note 60, at 110.
62. See Dorsett, supra note 60, at 115.
63. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-8.00 (West 1992 & Supp. 2002); Lieb et al.,
supra note 14, at 44. For the complete text of the Community Protection Act, see 1990
Wash. Laws ch.3, §§ 101-1406 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV.
CODE).
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(12).
65. Id. § 71.09.030.
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the sex offenders released from confinement in Washington were
subsequently committed to state custody.66
In 1994, the Kansas Legislature followed Washington's exam-
ple by passing the Sexually Violent Predator Act, modeled after
the Washington Act in both content and structure.6 ' The United
States Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of
the Kansas statute in two separate cases: Kansas v. Hendricks
and Kansas v. Crane.
III. THE KANSAS SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
A. Preamble
In its preamble, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act tar-
gets "an extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators
who have a mental abnormality or personality disorder and who
are likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not
treated."6" It justifies the need for this legislation by asserting
that "the existing civil commitment procedures... are inade-
quate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators
and the risks they present to society."69
B. Procedures and Protections
The Act allows for the process of civil conmitment to begin
while an individual is incarcerated." It requires prison authori-
ties to provide the state attorney general with notice of the an-
ticipated release of a sexual offender ninety days before the indi-
vidual's release date. 71 The state attorney general must then
determine whether the confined individual "meets the definition
of a sexually violent predator."72 If the individual fits this profile,
the attorney general may file a petition with the trial court, alleg-
66. Lieb et al., supra note 14, at 66.
67. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996). Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-29a04 (1994 & Supp. 2000), with WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030.
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
69. Id.
70. See id. § 59-29a03(a)(1).
71. Id. § 59-29a03(a), (a)(1).
72. Id. § 59-29a04(a).
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ing facts that support such a designation." If the trial judge de-
termines that probable cause exists that the individual meets this
definition, the Act gives the state authority to retain custody of
the individual." The detainee is entitled to a hearing within sev-
enty-two hours to contest this finding of probable cause,"5 at
which he is guaranteed the right to counsel, to present evidence,
to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to review and copy all
petitions and reports filed with the court. 6 If the court upholds
the finding of probable cause, the state transfers the offender to
an appropriate facility for a professional psychiatric evaluation."
The court must then conduct a trial within sixty days of the
probable cause hearing.' At this trial, the defendant is afforded
specific rights, such as the rights to appointed counsel and trial
by jury. 9 Further, the state has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is a sexually violent predator
within the meaning of the statute.8" If the finder of fact deter-
mines that there is sufficient evidence, the court must commit the
individual to the custody and care of the Secretary of the De-
partment of Social and Rehabilitation Services ("the Secretary")."
Once an individual has been committed, the Act provides three
potential methods of release.8 2 First, an offender must receive an
annual examination that evaluates his mental condition and
status as a sexually violent predator. 8 Based on this examina-
tion, the court may determine that probable cause exists to dem-
onstrate that the individual's condition has improved sufficiently
to be safely released.' Upon a finding of probable cause, the court
must schedule a hearing, in which the state may rebut the results
of the examination with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person remains a sexually violent predator.85 If the state cannot
73. Id.
74. Id. § 59-29a05(a).
75. Id. § 59-29a05(b).
76. Id. § 59-29a05(c).
77. Id. § 59-29a05(d). A county jail may be an "appropriate secure facility." Id.
78. Id. § 59-29a06.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 59-29a07(a).
81. Id.
82. Id. §§ 59-29a08(c), alO(b), all.
83. Id. § 59-29a08(a).
84. Id. § 59-29a08(b).
85. Id.
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meet this burden of proof, the individual must receive a transi-
tional release. 6
Under the second method, the Secretary may make the deter-
mination that the person should no longer be confined due to a
change in mental condition. Upon making this decision, the Sec-
retary authorizes the confined person to petition the court for a
transitional release.8 8 The court receiving the petition must hold
a hearing within thirty days. At this hearing, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual remains a
sexually violent predator, or must relinquish custody.9"
Finally, the offender may initiate a third form of release at any
time by filing a petition for discharge.9' However, if the Secretary
does not approve this petition, the court may deny it without a
hearing.92
C. The Mental Illness Standard
In order to classify an individual as a sexually violent predator
under the Act, two elements must exist: (1) the individual was
charged with or convicted of a violent sexual offense; and (2) the
individual "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes [him] likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence."93 This language includes several terms of art that re-
quire further definition.
1. Mental Abnormality
The Act defines "mental abnormality" as "a congenital or ac-
quired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses
in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
86. Id. § 59-29a08(c).
87. Id. § 59-29a10(a).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 59-29a10(a)-(b).
91. Id. § 59-29a11.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 59-29a02(a).
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safety of others."9 4 Volitional capacity is best explained as "the
capacity to exercise choice or will."9" In contrast, the term "emo-
tional capacity" accounts for bad behavior induced by some indi-
vidual factor other than a lack of control. 6
The definition of "mental abnormality" has generated a number
of questions.9 First, commentators have raised concerns that the
term does not meet the standard of "some medical justification,"
as outlined in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Foucha.9"
Since the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV")99 does not ad-
dress the term "mental abnormality," critics assert that the term
is not medically recognized and therefore not sufficient to justify
civil commitment.0 0
Moreover, critics question the definition of "mental abnormal-
ity" because of its circularity.'1 The Act establishes mental ab-
normality based on the individual's history of sexually deviant
behavior.' 2 The definition may therefore lack medical validity as
a standard for mental illness, since "the abnormality is derived
from the sexual behavior which in turn is used to establish the
predisposition to other sexual behavior."0 3 This circularity allows
the entire justification for commitment to be based upon prior
sexual misconduct, rather than a distinguishable mental infir-
mity. 104
In Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court only superfi-
cially analyzed the term "mental abnormality" in the context of
94. Id. § 59-29a02(b).
95. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 289 (Kan. 2000).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 709, 729-30 (1992).
98. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. Brooks,
supra note 97, at 730.
99. AM. PSYCIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
100. See Dorsett, supra note 60, at 139-42 (summarizing criticism of the Kansas Act's
use of term "mental abnormality"); cf. Brooks, supra note 105, at 730.
10L See Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually Vio-
lent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597, 602 (1992).
102. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
103. Wettstein, supra note 101, at 602.
104. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Mis-
use of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 698-99
(1992).
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the Kansas Act.' ° They found that the term was constitutionally
sound because it incorporated a condition that affects the ability
to control behavior.' 6 The Court determined that this standard
provided sufficient evidence that recidivism was likely to occur,
and therefore confinement was justified in order to protect public
safety.0 7 Because the Court found that the term was based on
reasonable legislative judgment, it applied no further scrutiny.'
Consequently, it failed to address whether a condition affecting
emotional rather than volitional capacity would be equally ac-
ceptable under constitutional standards.
2. Personality Disorder
The Kansas Act does not provide a specific definition for the
term "personality disorder." The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, however, recognizes it as a distinct mental condition, de-
scribing it as "an enduring pattern of inner experience and behav-
ior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture."0 9 To the extent that the DSM-IV definition
is accepted by the medical community, it appears to meet Justice
O'Connor's standard of "some medical justification.""0 Yet, the
question remains as to whether this type of disorder is suffi-
ciently pervasive to justify civil confinement.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT IN KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
A. The Act Survives Constitutional Challenge
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was used to commit
Leroy Hendricks after he served a ten-year sentence for taking
indecent liberties with two young boys.' A psychiatrist testified
at the commitment hearing that Hendricks suffered from pedo-
philia, a condition that qualified as a mental abnormality under
105. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1997).
106. Id. at 357-58.
107. Id. at 358.
108. See id. at 359.
109. DSM-IV, supra note 99, at 633.
110. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996).
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
the Act."2 Based in part on this testimony, the jury determined
that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator, and he was com-
mitted to state custody.1
3
In his appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Hendricks chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds."4
Upon review, the court determined that a substantial liberty in-
terest was at risk and therefore employed heightened scrutiny."
5
The court struck down the Act, holding that it violated Hendricks'
substantive due process rights."6 The court concluded that an an-
tisocial personality is not sufficient to constitute mental illness or
justify civil commitment."'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court explicitly out-
lined the basic substantive due process requirements for the civil
commitment laws."' First, the opinion noted that "freedom from
physical restraint" is a fundamental liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause."9 Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that this
protection is "not absolute." 2 ° The Court explained that states
have the right to commit individuals "who are unable to control
their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health
and safety."'2 ' The Court added, however, that this type of con-
finement must incorporate the "proper procedures and eviden-
tiary standards" to survive constitutional scrutiny. 22
The Court then stated that Hendricks's double jeopardy and ex
post facto challenges failed since the nature of the Act is civil
rather than criminal.123 In so holding, the Court explained that it
would "reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party
challenging the statute provides 'the clearest proof that 'the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
112. See id. at 131.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 133.
115. See id. at 136.
116. Id. at 138.
117. Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979)).
118. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1997).
119. Id. at 356.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 357.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 361.
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negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil. 12 4 The Court con-
cluded that Hendricks had not met this heightened standard. 125
The Court also stated that requirements of dangerousness and
mental illness in the Act satisfied due process. 126 The Act specifi-
cally requires a previous conviction for a sexually violent offense,
and also limits confinement to those offenders who exhibit a men-
tal abnormality or personality disorder that greatly increases the
likelihood that they would commit sexually violent acts in the fu-
ture.127 The Court explained that those two requirements, when
considered together, could constitute an effective predictor of fu-
ture predatory violence. 21
The Court then rejected the contention that "mental illness"
was the only standard that could be used to justify civil commit-
ment. 29 In support of this decision, the Court cited the differing
standards applied in Addington, Jackson, and Foucha and reiter-
ated that "'psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what
constitutes mental illness.""3 Ultimately, the Court held that the
Kansas Act satisfied substantive due process requirements be-
cause Hendricks's diagnosis of pedophilia fit the definition of a
mental abnormality. 3 '
The Court supported its decision using language that lies at
the heart of the "lack-of-control" debate, stating that previous
cases had upheld civil commitment statutes that "coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a
'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.", 3 2 This additional factor,
the Court asserted, limited confinement "to those who suffer from
a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control."'33 The Kansas Act meets this requirement, the Court
held, because it bases commitment on a finding of "a 'mental ab-
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)) (alterations in
original).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 358-60.
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
128. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
129. See id. at 359.
130. Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
131. Id. at 361.
132. Id. at 358.
133. Id.
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normality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior."'34
B. The Impact of Hendricks on the "Mental Illness" Standard
While the Court in Hendricks concluded that the civil commit-
ment of sexually violent predators was constitutionally permissi-
ble under the Kansas Act, it failed to define "mental illness" with
any further clarity.'35 Yet, the opinion suggests that the Kansas
statute met constitutional standards because it restricted "invol-
untary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional im-
pairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control."'36 The
use of this language raised the question of whether the "volitional
impairment" requirement was applicable only to the Hendricks
case, in which the defendant admitted his inability to control his
behavior,"' or whether it constituted a new due process require-
ment that applied to the civil commitments of all sex offenders. 3 '
Consequently, the Court in Kansas v. Crane' 9 revisited this issue
in an attempt to provide a more definitive illustration of the type
of offender who may fall within the purview of sexually violent
predator statutes. 4 °
V. THE APPROACH TO "LACK-OF-CONTROL" IN KANSAS V. CRANE
At Michael Crane's civil commitment hearing, the state pre-
sented evidence that Crane fulfilled both of the required elements
of the sexually violent predator statute.'4 ' He had been convicted
of aggravated sexual battery, which constituted a sexually violent
offense.44 Furthermore, state psychiatrist Leonardo Mabugat di-
agnosed him with antisocial personality disorder, which satisfied
134. Id.
135. See id. at 358-59.
136. Id. at 358.
137. See id. at 360.
138. See Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-
957).
139. 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002).
140. See id. at 870.
141. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 293 (Kan. 2000).
142. See id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(9) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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the mental illness component of the Act. 4 1 In support of this di-
agnosis, the jury heard testimony from three other state psy-
chologists who diagnosed Crane with antisocial personality disor-
der and exhibitionism.'4 One psychologist testified that, in his
opinion, this combination of disorders made Crane a sexually vio-
lent predator. 45 He predicted that Crane would become increas-
ingly daring and aggressive, which would result in an increase in
the frequency and intensity of incidents. 14 6 Based on this evi-
dence, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crane ful-
filled both of the required characteristics of a violent sexual
predator. 47
A. The Application of the Standard by the Kansas Supreme Court
Crane argued on appeal that, because a person may be diag-
nosed with a personality disorder without exhibiting an inability
to control behavior, the use of this standard to support civil com-
mitment was unconstitutional under Hendricks.4 ' Because the
state psychologists who testified at the hearing described Crane's
behavior as "a combination of willful and uncontrollable behav-
ior,"149 Crane argued that the state lacked a sufficient constitu-
tional basis to confine him as a sexually violent predator. 5 °
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Crane's contention. In
its holding, the court stated that "[a] fair reading of the majority
opinion in Hendricks leads us to the inescapable conclusion that
commitment under the Act is unconstitutional absent a finding
that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior."' 5'
Furthermore, the court concluded that "Crane suffers from a 'per-
sonality disorder,' which by definition does not include a voli-
143. Crane, 7 P.3d at 287, 289-90.
144. See Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
145. Id. at 6.
146. See Crane, 7 P.3d at 287.
147. See Brief of Petitioner at 8, Crane (No. 00-957).
148. Crane, 7 P.3d at 288, 290.
149. Id. at 290.
150. Id. at 288.
151. Id. at 290.
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tional impairment."15 2 Consequently, the court reversed and re-
manded his case for a new trial.
153
Kansas petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari to challenge the decision on the grounds that the
Kansas Supreme Court interpreted Hendricks in an overly re-
strictive manner. 54 The United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether an individual who possesses a limited ability
to control his behavior should fall under the purview of civil
commitment laws. 55
B. The United States Supreme Court's Response
The Supreme Court rejected the strict volitional control re-
quirement adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court, and accord-
ingly vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 156 The Court explained that the language used in
Hendricks--"difficult, if not impossible... to control"--permitted
the commitment of offenders who did not display a complete in-
ability to control their behavior.'57 This conclusion was supported
with the argument that "an absolutist approach is unworkable,"
because even those individuals who display the most severe forms
of mental illness exhibit some degree of control over their behav-
ior. ' Furthermore, the Court explained that "[i]nsistence upon
absolute lack of control would risk barring the civil commitment
of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormali-
ties."59
On the other hand, the Court did not imply that an inability to
control behavior was irrelevant in civil commitment decisions. 160
Rather, the Court considered the presence of volitional control to
be an important factor that could be used to distinguish the of-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867, 868 (2002).
155. See Brief of Petitioner at i, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
156. Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 868.
157. Id. at 870 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)) (emphasis in
original).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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fenders subject to civil commitment from those who were "'more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal justice proceed-
ings.'''161 Consequently, the Court held that a fact-finder must de-
termine that an offender suffers from a "lack-of-control" in order
to impose continued confinement. 162
Nevertheless, the Court only vaguely articulated the appropri-
ate standard to be applied in making these determinations. 63 The
Court explained that, because volitional impairments cannot be
measured with any "mathematical precision,"'1 64 it is important to
create a standard that can be reasonably applied to a variety of
circumstances.'65 The Court stated that "i]t is enough to say that
there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behav-
ior... in light of such features of the case as the nature of the
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality
itself."1 66 Further decisions regarding the application of the stan-
dard were to be made "as specific circumstances require." 67
The Court attempted to justify this vague standard by explain-
ing that "the Constitution's safeguards... are not always best en-
forced through precise bright-line rules."6 Rather, the Court as-
serted that it was best to proceed "deliberately and contextually,
elaborating generally stated constitutional standards and objec-
tives .... ,,169 The Court believed this approach allowed the states
to retain a level of autonomy in defining eligibility standards,
while also providing ample flexibility for advances in the field of
psychiatry. 1
70
The Court then addressed the applicability of the Kansas stat-
ute to those offenders who suffered from emotional and cognitive
impairments, rather than a purported lack of control.' In
Hendricks, the Court had not addressed this issue because
Hendricks was a pedophile who admitted his inability to control
161. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 871.
166. Id. at 870.
167. Id. at 871.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 871.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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his behavior.'72 Consequently, the State specifically posed this
question to the Court in Crane.'73
In response, the Court pointed out that Hendricks had drawn
no clear distinction between "'emotional" and "'volitional' ab-
normalities.'74 The Court further explained that, in previous
cases, no distinction had been made between volitional, emo-
tional, and cognitive impairments in the context of constitutional
analysis, as these have been perceived as areas in which there is
"'considerable overlap.""7 Nevertheless, the majority opinion does
not provide a direct answer to the question: "The Court in
Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement
based solely on 'emotional' abnormality would be constitutional,
and we likewise have no occasion to do so in the present case."
76
C. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision in Crane was
inconsistent with the holding in Hendricks.'7' He contended that
the Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in its
entirety in Hendricks, and therefore no cause existed to revisit its
constitutionality. 7 He asserted that the statute as written, with-
out a separate control requirement, already sufficiently distin-
guished between those offenders subject to civil commitment and
those subject to criminal liability, as it required a finding of a
"causal connection" between the probability of future acts of sex-
ual violence and the present existence of a mental disorder.'79 He
argued that this combination of factors already assumed the
"'difficulty, if not impossibility' in controlling behavior and that a
separate requirement was unnecessary. 8 °
172. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
173. Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 870.
174. Id. at 871.
175. Id. (quoting Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association
Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AMt. J. PsYcHiATRY 681, 685 (1983)).
176. Id. at 872.
177. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 875.
179. Id. at 873-74.
180. Id. at 873.
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Furthermore, he argued that, because the Court narrowly in-
terpreted Hendricks to cover only volitional applications of the
statute, it reopened the question of whether emotional and cogni-
tive impairments were permitted to fall within the scope of the
statute.181 He denied that there was merit in the distinction be-
tween volitional and other types of impairments, noting that "[i]t
is obvious that a person may be able to exercise volition and yet
be unfit to turn loose upon society."'82 Nonetheless, he asserted
that, in failing to uphold the statute in its entirety, the Court had
left this issue open for future debate.183
In his concluding remarks, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the
ambiguity favored by the majority in Crane.84 He argued that the
Court failed to provide guidance to trial courts as to how to in-
struct juries in future cases, and left the law in "a state of utter
indeterminacy."8 '
VI. QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN AFTER CRANE
A. Can Sexually Violent Predator Laws Be Applied to Offenders
with Emotional and Cognitive Impairments?
In Hendricks and Crane, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Kansas statute as applied to offenders with a lack of con-
trol and failed to address the applicability of the statute to indi-
viduals with other mental impairments.'86 Consequently, the
question remains as to whether offenders who commit premedi-
tated, controlled acts while in a state of delusion or hallucination
could be classified as sexually violent predators.'87 Justice Scalia
addressed this conundrum in his dissent, stating that "[t]he man
who has a will of steel, but who delusionally believes that every
woman he meets is inviting crude sexual advances, is surely a
dangerous sexual predator."' Nevertheless, if the statute applies
181. Id. at 874-75.
182. Id. at 875.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 875-77.
185. Id. at 876.
186. Compare id. at 871, with Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
187. Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
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strictly to individuals who display a lack of control, these indi-
viduals will fall outside of its reach.'89
This approach has been strongly criticized. 9 ° Opponents con-
tend that offenders with emotional and cognitive impairments
present an equal danger to society and may be found legally in-
sane under current laws, and thus their exclusion is unfounded. 9 '
Even Crane's counsel admitted that the exclusion of emotional
and cognitive impairments was unjustified, conceding in his oral
argument before the Court that "what the Kansas Supreme Court
did was effectively cut off.., the ability of the State to incapaci-
tate people who have other type [sic] of significant mental disor-
ders such as... the hallucinations, the psychoses. Those are a
different breed of mental illnesses with different effects." 92
Furthermore, critics argue that the distinction between these
types of impairments is not meaningful because they frequently
coexist in mentally ill offenders.'93 Mental health experts have
observed that "considerable overlap between a psychotic person's
defective understanding or appreciation and his ability to control
his behavior [exists]."' 9 While the Court acknowledged the im-
practicability of this type of distinction in Crane, it left the ques-
tion to be addressed "'deliberately and contextually'" in future
cases.
195
B. Is a "Lack-of-Control" Standard Workable in the Legal
System?
Critics also argue that a mental illness standard based on voli-
tional control proves unworkable in the legal context.196 Cur-
rently, the standard incorporates no legal construct that would
189. See id. at 875-76.
190. See Falk, supra note 25, at 141.
191. See id. at 140 (demonstrating overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of Kansas
Act).
192. Transcript of Oral Argument, Kansas v. Crane, No. 00-957, 2001 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 58, at *47 (Oct. 30, 2001).
193. See Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on
the Insanity Defense, 140 A. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983).
194. Id.
195. Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 871; id. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. See, e.g., Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
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enable courts to make normative determinations regarding an of-
fender's ability to control his behavior.197 While mental health de-
terminations such as insanity and competency employ objective
criteria such as knowing, understanding, and communicating, vo-
litional standards provide no such foundations upon which fact-
finders can base their decisions. 9 ' It is for this reason that "irre-
sistible impulse" standards have previously been rejected by the
legal system.'99
Moreover, this standard generally precludes experts from
reaching ultimate conclusions regarding legal issues."' Yet, un-
der a lack-of-control standard, it would appear that the findings
of a mental health professional would conclusively guide the ul-
timate decision of whether an individual could exercise his free
will and control his behavior at the time of his offense.20 ' The
American Medical Association criticized this practice in the past,
asserting that "it is impossible for psychiatrists to determine
whether a mental impairment has affected the defendant's capac-
ity for voluntary choice, or caused him to commit the particular
act in question."2 2 Other mental health professionals have noted
that "any such inquiry would have to focus on the defendant's de-
sires, thoughts, and feelings, which are.., inaccessible by any
currently known measuring techniques."2 3 The application of this
standard, therefore, could result in less than satisfactory out-
comes, "because [if] the psychiatrist can't make a determination
objectively, we're left with a potential predator telling us who ap-
plies-who's eligible for this law and who isn't."20 4
The Court attempted to address this issue in Crane, observing
that "the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not control
197. See Falk, supra note 25, at 141.
198. Id.; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (discussing insanity);
Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness for
Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 437, 446-47 (1995) (discussing incompetence).
199. See Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers at 4, Crane (No.
00-957).
200. See Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 198, at 446-47.
201. See id. at 446.
202. Bd. of Trs., Am. Med. Ass'n, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitation of
Psychiatric Testimony, 251 JAMA 2967, 2978 (1984).
203. Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers at 7, Crane (No. 00-
957).
204. Transcript of Oral Argument, Kansas v. Crane, No. 00-957, 2001 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 58, at *7 (Oct. 30, 2001).
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ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science,
whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the
law." °5 Nevertheless, the Court failed to specify the appropriate
legal construct that could serve as a neutral benchmark for
judges and juries in making this determination. Consequently,
fact-finders will likely be forced to make decisions regarding the
defendant's lack of control with little guidance other than the tes-
timony of mental health professionals, who will remain the de-
finitive voice in civil commitment decisions.
C. Should Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder Fall
Within the Scope of Sexually Violent Predator Laws?
The Kansas Act as written applies not only to individuals with
a "mental abnormality," but also to those who suffer from a "per-
sonality disorder."" 6 This inclusion of personality disorders sig-
nificantly expands the scope of the law to include a wide variety
of individuals with a broad range of mental impairment.0 ' This
effect has been staunchly criticized by opponents who feel that it
opens the door for the civil commitment of individuals deemed
"mentally ill" merely because of their penchant for criminal activ-
ity.208 Specifically, opponents challenge the application of these
laws to individuals diagnosed with "antisocial personality disor-
der," charging that this disorder is constitutionally insufficient to
justify civil commitment.0 9
Antisocial personality disorder is described by the DSM-IV as
"a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights
of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and con-
tinues into adulthood."21 ° An individual who receives this diagno-
sis must demonstrate the following characteristics: (1) the indi-
vidual must be at least eighteen years old;21' (2) there must be
evidence of a conduct disorder, which includes aggression toward
people and animals, destruction of property, deceitfulness or
205. Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867, 871 (2002).
206. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
207. See In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 289-90 (Kan. 2000).
208. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 139-40 (Kan. 1996) (Lockett, J., concur-
ring).
209. See id. at 140.
210. DSM-IV, supra note 99, at 645.
211 Id. at 650.
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theft, or serious violations of rules;212 and (3) there must be a per-
vasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of oth-
ers occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of
the following: failure to conform to laws or social norms, deceit-
fulness, impulsivity, irresponsibility, irritability and aggressive-
ness, reckless disregard for safety and an absence of remorse.213
This diagnosis does not, however, take account of antisocial be-
havior occurring during schizophrenic or manic episodes.21 4
Many civil commitment statutes have specifically excluded an-
tisocial personality disorder as a basis for confinement.2 This ex-
clusion stems from estimations that as many as seventy-five per-
cent of prison inmates suffer from this disorder.1 6 Furthermore,
the American Psychiatric Association asserts that "the presence
of 'antisocial personality disorder' as the condition causing the
danger provides no meaningful limiting principle" for civil com-
mitment statutes.2
Conversely, supporters argue that antisocial personality disor-
der is not a sufficiently common diagnosis among the American
population to justify exclusion. 218 DSM-IV statistics support this
proposition, indicating that only three percent of males and one
percent of females in the general population suffer from the dis-
order.21 9
The inclusion of antisocial personality disorder is further sup-
ported by the fact that, under its current definition, it sufficiently
meets the Hendricks standard because "it narrows the class of
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to con-
trol their dangerousness. "22' The DSM-IV distinguishes antisocial
personality disorder from general criminal behavior, stating that
212. Id. at 90, 650.
213. Id. at 649-50.
214. Id. at 650.
215. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(22) (West 1993) (defining mental disor-
der within general civil commitment statute to exclude "personality disorders character-
ized by... antisocial behavior patterns").
216. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).
217. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychia-
try and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.
Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957) (citation omitted).
218. See Brief of Petitioner at 22, Crane (No. 00-957).
219. DSM-IV, supra note 99, at 648.
220. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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"[o]nly when antisocial personality traits are inflexible, maladap-
tive, and persistent and cause significant functional impairment
or subjective distress do they constitute Antisocial Personality
Disorder."221 Under these guidelines, an individual cannot be con-
fined merely because he committed a criminal act and has exhib-
ited "an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive
conduct."222 For that reason, these statutes appear to create the
necessary framework to abate the Court's concern regarding
statutory misuse, and the inclusion of these types of offenders
should be constitutionally permissible.
VII. FUTURE DIRECTION OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS
The difficulties with the "lack-of-control" standard make its
utility in the legal system problematic. Consequently, the Court
in future cases should consider constructing a new standard that
incorporates elements that are more easily applicable in the legal
context.
A. Present Dangerousness
The prediction of future dangerousness that is currently used
to justify civil commitment requires mental health professionals
to perform beyond the scope of their expertise.2 23 The American
Psychiatric Association states that any "psychiatric prediction
that someone like Crane presents a near-term threat of serious
harm is inherently uncertain."22 ' Accordingly, the Court should
revise the standard to require only an assessment of present dan-
gerousness, focusing the courts' examination on "the current risk
posed by the individual."2 5
221. DSM-IV, supra note 99, at 649.
222. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).
223. Falk, supra note 25, at 141.
224. Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychia-
try and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.
Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
225. Falk, supra note 25, at 145-46.
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B. Criminal Irresponsibility
Prior case law historically equated mental illness with lack of
criminal responsibility, under the rationale that dangerous per-
sons who are able to control their behavior are "more properly
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings."226 Further-
more, critics of sexually violent predator laws have asserted that
[t]o allow the state to first choose the criminal sanction, which re-
quires a finding of a specific state of mind, and when that sanction is
completed, to choose another sanction which requires a finding of the
opposite state of mind, is a mockery of justice which places both the
criminal and civil systems for dealing with sexual predators in disre-
pute.
22 7
For this reason, it would appear more legally sound to limit the
application of sexually violent predator statutes to "those danger-
ous persons who cannot be incarcerated within the criminal jus-
tice system. "228
Accordingly, legislatures should pursue extended criminal sen-
tences for sex offenders, especially recidivists, and should allow
for indeterminate sentencing as a judicial option.229 Under this
framework, the state gives to the parole boards, rather than the
mental health system, the responsibility for determining whether
a sex offender has been rehabilitated and is safe for release.23 °
This would help untangle the complicated relationship that cur-
rently exists between civil commitment and criminal processes,
which has had the effect of "[t]urning doctors into jailers..., un-
dermining the therapeutic alliance with their patients that is ba-
sic to medicine generally and psychiatry in particular."23'
226. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
227. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1994) (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
228. Falk, supra note 25, at 145.
229. See id. at 146. For example, the Colorado Sex Offenders Act currently provides for
indeterminate sentencing that allows for a sex offender to remain in custody "a minimum
of one day and a maximum of his natural life." COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-13-203 (2001).
230. See Falk, supra note 25, at 147. Under the Colorado law, within six months after
confinement and annually thereafter, the parole board must review "all reports, records,
and information" related to the offender's confinement to determine whether the person
should be paroled. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-202(1), -216 (2001).
231. Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychia-
try and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.
Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
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C. Mental Health Specialty Courts
States should also consider the establishment of additional
mental health specialty courts. 212 These judicial forums have
sprung up across the United States in recent years in an attempt
to address the growing population of mentally ill offenders housed
within the jails and prisons.2" The goal of mental health courts is
to prevent the "revolving door" phenomenon that often occurs for
mentally ill defendants by focusing on treatment efforts while
"minimizing the detrimental effects of the law."234
The duties of mental health specialty courts may include com-
mitting individuals who were deemed incompetent to stand trial
in criminal proceedings, monitoring patients on conditional re-
lease, and dealing with individuals who were found to be danger-
ous or physically or mentally ill.2 5 The proceedings in these
courts are typically nonadversarial, with the judge involving not
only the prosecution and defense, but also correctional facilities,
law enforcement personnel, and health care providers, in deter-
mining appropriate outcomes.236
These specialty courts may serve as a more impartial and effec-
tive forum for sexually violent predators. The judges and lawyers
who participate have more expertise in the area of mental illness,
and can more readily distinguish between those offenders who
require treatment and those for whom punishment is more ap-
propriate. 7 Furthermore, judges with specialized knowledge in
mental illness may provide more effective monitoring of sex of-
fenders, possibly allowing for the utilization of less restrictive al-
ternatives, thereby reducing the frequency of civil commitment.
232. For a detailed discussion of the use of mental health specialty courts, see generally
LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the
Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373
(2000).
233. See id. at 373.
234. Id. at 374, 381.
235. See id. at 410 (describing general duties of mental health specialty courts).
236. Id. at 411.
237. See id. at 412, 415-16.
238. Id. at 407, 421.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Between active psychosis and complete psychological stability
exists a wide range of mental conditions." 9 These circumstances
create a dilemma for the courts, which are left with the responsi-
bility of determining a point beyond which a person should be
confined based on their level of mental illness. While the Court
intended to use Kansas v. Crane to illuminate this standard in re-
lation to sexually violent predator laws, it failed to provide a
clear, workable framework for mental illness determinations.24 °
Consequently, it is likely that the Court will again face questions
regarding the permissible scope of sexually violent predator stat-
utes.
Because a lack-of-control standard appears to create significant
difficulties in the legal context, the Court should reconsider its
policy of "proceeding deliberately and contextually," and develop
an appropriate measure for mental illness.24' A concrete, viable
standard that is not overly reliant on mental health professionals
and that provides states with guidelines effectively targeting the
most dangerous within this group of offenders is necessary to ef-
fectively provide for the public safety.
Nevertheless, the Court in Crane made it clear that such a
standard is not forthcoming. This reluctance was explained dur-
ing oral arguments in Crane, as one of the justices explicitly ad-
mitted that, "[w]e're not psychiatrists or psychologists either.
That's... part of the problem.., in our setting as precise a
benchmark as you would like us to set."2 Consequently, the
Court is likely to continue to avoid venturing into the mysteries of
the mind, leaving mental illness to remain a vague concept in
courtrooms and legislatures for years to come.
Georgia Smith Hamilton
239. See Brief of Petitioner at 11, Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002) (No. 00-957).
240. See discussion supra Parts V.C, VI.
241. Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867, 871 (2002).
242. Transcript of Oral Argument, Kansas v. Crane, No. 00-957, 2001 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 58, at *46 (Oct. 30, 2001).
